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TRAINING TOMORROW'S NAVY
The Impact of Joint Vision 2010 on Training Naval Forces

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

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The Impact of Joint Vision 2010 on Training Naval Forces

The introduction of Joint Vision 2010 will drive fundamental changes in the methods the Navy uses to train its forces. The four new operational concepts (Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics) each exploit service-unique capabilities to achieve “full spectrum dominance.”

Because these concepts require the tools each service brings to the battlefield, the employment of combined arms will increasingly depend on a joint force that trains together to refine these capabilities. Therefore, naval training processes will shift from primarily a single-service focus to a joint force structure, emphasizing interoperability and integration issues.

Joint training program initiatives have already started the transition to a joint focus, under the auspices of USACOM in its role of “Joint Force Integrator.” Naval commanders have also made changes to improve the level of joint training.

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Initiatives from both the joint sector and the Navy will bring the training of naval forces to a substantially different training syllabus than the current model. More issues must be addressed to complete the transition from “synergistic” joint operations to “coherent” joint operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>ABSTRACT</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>INTRODUCTION</i>	<i>1</i>
How are naval forces trained currently?	<i>2</i>
Initiatives	<i>4</i>
Challenges	<i>9</i>
Conclusions	<i>10</i>
Recommendations	<i>11</i>
<i>NOTES</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>BIBLIOGRAPHY</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>APPENDIX I : Description of Joint Vision 2010's New Operational Concepts</i>	<i>I</i>

Joint Vision 2010 creates the template to guide the transformation of these [new operational] concepts into joint operational capabilities. It serves as the basis for focusing the strengths of each individual service or component to exploit the full array of available capabilities and allow us to achieve full spectrum dominance. It will also guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to assure we will be able to achieve more seamless joint operations in the future.

- Joint Vision 2010 ¹

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) as a form of strategic guidance to focus the development of joint warfighting capabilities of the U.S. military into the next century. While reaffirming the need to capitalize on the strengths of each service, it also sets a state of “more seamless joint operations” as a goal. These themes are repeated in the descriptions of JV 2010’s new operational concepts: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics. Appendix I contains descriptions of these concepts, highlighting these themes in context.

The language of JV 2010 is explicit in requiring the services to work more closely together. The four new operational concepts are interdependent upon one another to achieve “full spectrum dominance.” More importantly, the new operational concepts require the distinct capabilities of each service, working in concert with the others, in order to function properly. This paper will focus on how the training of naval forces will change to achieve the joint fighting force envisioned in JV 2010.

To develop these new operational concepts, JV 2010 describes several “critical considerations,” including “education and training programs,” and “agile organizations.”² Key characteristics of these training programs are the emphasis on integration of joint capabilities, and the increased use of simulation in combination with field training exercises.

Simulation can be utilized to “*...upgrade the levels of day-to-day readiness, and increase opportunities to test innovative concepts and new strategies.*”³ The “agile organization” concept mandates forces that are “*...responsive to contingencies, with less startup time between deployment and employment.*”⁴ The idea of an “agile organization” also implies flexibility in chain-of-command relationships so that forces may be quickly assembled in a task force that is tailored appropriately to the existing situation.

The methods the U.S. Navy uses to train its forces will be significantly changed with the implementation of JV 2010. Initiatives introduced within the last few years have begun this process, but more significant measures are required to maximize the effectiveness of the naval component of U.S. fighting forces. Significant institutional obstacles also must be addressed in order to achieve JV 2010 goals. Narrowing the focus, this analysis will not examine JV 2010 “technology leveraging” issues, but instead will concentrate on issues related to training forces. Staff training—an area in which the combatant commanders have developed extensive programs—will also be excluded from this analysis.

How are naval forces trained currently?

As prescribed by law (Chapter 6, title 10, United States Code), the Navy is responsible “*...to recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands.*”⁵ [Emphasis added.] In the last decade, the Navy has utilized a robust, milestone-based method in training its forces. In a “turnaround” training cycle, units from the largest Navy force packages, Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), commence a building-block approach to training upon return from a

major deployment. As the training cycle commences, Battle Group units progress from basic unit-level tasks through coordinated unit tactics, a Composite Training Unit Exercise, and ultimately, a Fleet Exercise just before deployment. Since 1995, the Fleet Exercise has been given a “joint” flavor and renamed “Joint Task Force Exercise” (JTFEX). Concurrent with this training cycle, Battle Group staff and key operations personnel from Battle Group units participate in a tactical training continuum that introduces joint force operational concepts. Some units may also participate in joint exercises of opportunity, such as Army-sponsored ROVING SANDS, if the exercise is scheduled outside important CVBG turnaround training milestones.

Still, the only significant, routinely scheduled event in this training program designed to expose naval operating forces to joint operations is the naval component-sponsored JTFEX, which retains a predominantly Navy-Marine Corps focus. In its most basic form, there is minimal participation from other services. The exercise tends to emphasize joint training objectives of CVBG, ARG, and Carrier Air Wing staffs, while the majority of the participants may only rarely encounter forces from their sister services. Participation from Army, Air Force and even allied nation forces is much greater when opportunity and other circumstances permit (particularly in Atlantic Fleet exercises, for reasons to be discussed later); however, the baseline JTFEX does not include widespread participation from other services. Simulation and/or procedures-based training techniques offset deficits in joint force participation.

Initiatives

A recent General Accounting Office study determined that out of over 200 exercises conducted world-wide in 1994 under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program, less than one-third had joint training of U.S. forces as their primary focus.⁶ The study also determined that a large majority of the exercises conducted overseas were held mainly for presence or access purposes. Additionally, the joint exercises that *were* conducted under this program for the purpose of training U.S. joint forces had a lack of realistic objectives and measurable standards. Remedial actions for these problems are being addressed by the implementation of several initiatives, both from the joint structure as well as service training.⁷

In the past, combatant commanders gave little emphasis to joint operations in the training process for CONUS-based forces. Pursuant to the post-Cold War redeployment, many U.S. forces previously stationed overseas returned to CONUS bases. In 1993, the Secretary of Defense restructured U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) to include most of the CONUS-based forces (over 75% of all U.S. military forces), assigning the command two new missions. These missions were: 1) the role of "Joint Force Integrator," and 2) the role of Executive Agent for the joint training program, including the responsibility for training assigned CONUS-based forces.⁸

To help define the joint force integration mission, General Sheehan, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, compares recent "synergistic" joint operations and the JV 2010 goal:

Synergistic joint operations are mutually supporting in that JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] orchestrate separate service capabilities for common tactical

objectives...To achieve Joint Vision 2010...we must be able to conduct coherent joint operations. JFCs must be able to integrate service capabilities to achieve common tactical and operational objectives.⁹ [Emphasis added.]

Tier two of ACOM's three-tiered joint training program moves joint operations towards the "coherent" level through a field training exercise program, which includes Atlantic Fleet's JTFEX exercises. Component commanders develop these exercises based on a list of critical interoperability tasks from supported CINCs.¹⁰ The priority of this program is on requirements-based training, with the goal "*to ensure that no U.S. military member or unit is confronted with a joint warfighting task for the first time after arrival in-theater. [The] intent is to provide a common level of training to forces at the unit level prior to deployment to the warfighting CINC [Commander-in-Chief]'s theater.*"¹¹ The emphasis on requirements and interoperability training is unique in comparison to previous joint exercise programs. Two other signs of ACOM's commitment to the joint training program include the development of extensive simulation facilities, and close coordination with the Joint Warfighting Center to ensure compliance with joint doctrine during training evolutions.

The current joint organizational structure details nearly all Army and Air Force CONUS-based combatant forces to ACOM component commands. In the case of the Navy and Marine Corps, however, the forces are more evenly split between ACOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). While the purpose of the ACOM training and integration mission was to standardize joint training of CONUS-based forces, exclusion of CONUS-based Pacific Fleet Navy and Marine Corps forces seemingly represents a disconnect in this premise. Joint Training Master Plan 1998 recognizes that both ACOM and PACOM will share duties of training their own assigned CONUS-based forces, respectively, stating that "USPACOM will

collaborate with USACOM to coordinate training of USPACOM's assigned CONUS-based forces.”¹² The actual mechanisms and practice of this collaboration are not clear.

In contrast to ACOM’s focus on common joint tasks from supported CINCs, PACOM’s training program emphasizes a Pacific theater orientation.¹³ PACOM forces conduct nearly all field training exercises overseas, limiting CONUS-based force participation to rotationally deployed forces only. The PACOM program also emphasizes requirements-based training—the difference being that PACOM uses requirements from its own theater-specific Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMELT), instead of the common joint tasks used by ACOM.¹⁴

From the Navy’s perspective, requirements drawn from traditional Navy missions drove training programs in the past. Individual units were rated on the degree of proficiency in their own tactical tasks and missions, with some certifications linked to the performance of operations with other naval units. Readiness reporting was almost entirely devoted to a unit’s proficiency in Navy-only missions, with little emphasis given to training for joint force missions. Therefore, naval commanders had little motivation (or justification) in devoting time or resources to joint training. Similarly, geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) had no way to gauge the readiness of their assigned or prospective forces for duty in a joint force environment.

In support of the JMELT process, the Navy is developing a Navy Mission Essential Task List. One of the primary goals is to “ensure intermediate and advanced training are seamless with joint training.”¹⁵ Aligning service training objectives with the Joint training structure enables the development of a framework that will more accurately reflect the joint

warfighting capabilities of naval forces. This system will also accommodate a better mix of service and joint training requirements in joint exercises. As envisioned in the Joint Training Master Plan: "Instead of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines effectively stopping their individual and unit training in order to participate in a joint exercise, many of the service requirements can be incorporated, through effective planning, into CINC-sponsored joint events."¹⁶

Naval commanders, in conjunction with combatant commanders, are increasing the emphasis on joint training. In the ACOM area of responsibility, Commander Second Fleet has enhanced JTFEX events with increased amounts of joint and combined force training. Additionally, he has added joint duty billets to his staff, "J-coding" his staff codes. Training scenarios have improved due to the addition of joint duty billets in the Tactical Training Groups on both coasts.¹⁷ With ACOM-sponsorship and greater access to CONUS-based Army and Air Force units, the opportunities for participation in joint exercises are more frequent for naval forces assigned to the Atlantic Fleet than in the Pacific Fleet. Without the benefit of CONUS-based Army and Air Force units operating within PACOM, Pacific naval forces must negotiate with ACOM forces for participation in their exercises, or must seek additional training opportunities in ACOM-sponsored exercises.¹⁸ In order to address some of the shortfalls in Pacific Fleet training, Commander Third Fleet has turned to simulation and procedural-based training. In PAC JTFEX 96-2, Fleet Combat Training Center Pacific blended and injected both real and simulated forces to enhance the realism of the training.¹⁹ Additionally, a complex Theater Missile Defense scenario was interwoven throughout the exercise, capitalizing on the new Common Operational Modeling, Planning and Simulation

Strategy (COMPASS) developed by Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Command's Research, Development and Test Division.²⁰

Integration of Theater Missile Defense scenarios into JTFEX events represents an example how Navy training is changing to incorporate key elements of JV 2010. In describing the “full dimensional protection” concept, JV 2010 specifically refers to Theater Missile Defense as an active measure that exploits “*service-unique capabilities to detect, identify, locate, track, and deny enemy attacks on our joint forces.*”²¹ Several recent JTFEXs have included Army Patriot missile batteries, naval theater missile defense assets and the COMPASS simulation program to exercise this component of the “full dimensional protection” concept.

In another key naval training evolution, Carrier Air Wings exercise at Naval Air Station Fallon for strike warfare training prior to fleet deployment. Dependent on Air Wing Commander preferences, the Air Wing may request participation from Air Force units during the training evolution. Even if Air Force units do not participate, Air Wing personnel learn joint air operations procedures by preparing and executing an Air Tasking Order (ATO) just as they would in an actual joint air operation. Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center recently expanded the Air Wing training syllabus to include two days and one night of Joint Battle Field Operations.²² Additionally, the training syllabus places increased emphasis on qualifying aircrew as Forward Air Controller (Airborne) to enhance close air support missions for ground forces.

Challenges

Evolutionary training strategies must address the following challenges to achieve the JV 2010 goal of “more seamless joint operations”:

- “Building-block” approach to turnaround training
- Scheduling conflicts with other components
- Atlantic Fleet vs. Pacific Fleet Training Methods

Building-block turnaround training. Several factors contribute to the difficulty in adding joint training objectives to the Navy training process. The turnaround training model described earlier leaves little room for increased training requirements. The “back to square one” mentality of unit readiness following a deployment abandons emphasis on coordinated unit training until late in the training cycle. Due to higher operational tempo (caused by the drawdown in forces), schedulers can barely accommodate existing service training requirements. Attempts to incorporate additional joint training requirements further strain the training timeline. Periodic maintenance/upkeep requirements, inspections, and personnel rotations also influence training schedules, detracting from participation in exercises of opportunity. Rigid timing of specific training milestones put further constraints on exercise scheduling. This gradual, iterative increase in unit readiness makes it difficult for a CVBG to deploy on short notice, especially before a normal turnaround cycle is complete. Joint training objectives are difficult to accomplish prior to the JTFEX “graduation/ready-to-deploy” exercise near the end of the training cycle.

Scheduling conflicts. The absence of a coordinated joint structure incorporating units that will deploy together inhibits synchronization of training schedules between the services.

Instead, each service sponsors their own training continuum for their own forces, maintaining varying degrees of readiness. Opportunities for joint training become less frequent, due to lack of effort to ensure that units slated to deploy together will train together.

Pacific Fleet vs. Atlantic Fleet training. As previously covered in detail, Pacific Fleet naval forces are trained differently than their Atlantic Fleet counterparts. One could argue that these differing approaches are appropriate given the theaters in which these forces will deploy. On the other hand, if joint force interoperability is a concern, why should half the Navy be trained differently than the other half?

Conclusions

JV 2010 will drive changes to the way the Navy trains its forces and sharpen the focus of joint training initiatives. The very essence of the new operational concepts requires synergism of service-unique capabilities and the synthesis of the four concepts to achieve the envisioned full spectrum dominance. This synergism dictates that the services *train together* to exploit current capabilities and develop new ones—instead of training separately...to *operate together*. As one author illustrates the problem: “*The U.S. armed services usually prefer to work side by side—each doing independently what it does best—instead of intermingling for seamless joint operations.*”²³

Past problems with the relevancy of joint exercise training are being corrected by the development of the JMETL and ACOM’s “train-to-task” philosophy. As service training requirements are blended with joint requirements, training evolutions will achieve more relevant objectives in the future.

The assignment of the Joint Force Integration mission to ACOM, using the majority of CONUS-based forces to achieve standardization, started the U.S. military on the road to more coherent joint operations. The exclusion of roughly half the Navy and Marine Corps' CONUS-based forces (currently assigned to PACOM) from the program undermines this goal of standardization and works against the best interests of the affected forces, instead reinforcing a "two-Navy" syndrome.

Because the future means smaller force levels, unit operational tempo will continue to increase. There will be fewer CVBGs and ARGs to answer the same number (or more) calls for military force. In order to respond to crises globally, the Navy cannot solely rely on forward presence to address future threats—but must make its CONUS-based forces more readily deployable on short notice. The current building block method used in training CVBGs is not conducive to "surging" a Battle Group for redeployment within a year from returning from an extended deployment. If the Navy is going to meet the JV 2010 challenge for "agile organizations," it must redefine its combatant force training timeline.

Recommendations

The following proposed measures should be carefully examined to address shortfalls in current training strategies.

- *Assign CONUS-based Pacific Fleet Navy/Marine Corps forces to U.S. Atlantic Command when not deployed.* The single biggest advantage is availability of training resources. Pacific Fleet Navy/Marine Corps forces do not get as much joint force interaction during their recurring exercises because the CONUS-based forces of their sister services are owned by another CINC. Although PACOM coordinates with ACOM (in theory) on the

training of its CONUS-based forces, the programs are not identical. This condition detracts from standardization between Atlantic and Pacific Fleet operations.

- *Reassess the validity of the “building block” training model for naval forces.* Units that have just returned from a deployment are at the peak of their interoperability skills—yet those skills are devalued until nearly a year later in the training process. Transforming the current method into one which intersperses joint force training with unit and service training objectives throughout the training process would create more opportunities for joint force integration and keep naval forces in a higher state of readiness for unanticipated deployments.
- *Organize forces that will deploy together into “Training Joint Task Forces” while based in CONUS.* Others have proposed similar ideas.²⁴ In the absence of contingency operations, CINCs know well in advance who will be deploying to their theater during a given time frame. While there is bound to be some overlap in deployment schedules, these loosely formed groups can better develop “hand-off” strategies and work out interoperability issues before deployment, rather than trying to sort out these details in theater. Advance identification of these units to each other enables critical warrior-to-warrior liaison to occur while the units are still in CONUS in their training phase. Organizing forces under this concept allows for synchronization of pre-deployment scheduling, multiplies the opportunities for joint training organized under the auspices of the joint structure, and creates opportunities for informal inter-service cooperation.

As the Navy moves towards the goals of JV 2010, it will find that traditional service training requirements—the old “Navy-only” missions—are becoming more “joint.” More of

what once were considered naval tasks are now *naval tasks with joint applications*. Interdependent operational concepts relying on the synergism of service-unique capabilities will drive training requirements, and thus service training, towards more seamless joint operations.

NOTES

- ¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Vision 2010," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996, 47.
- ² *Ibid.*, 47-48.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 48.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.
- ⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Pub 0-2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 24 February 1995), II-12, II-13.
- ⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Military Capabilities—Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance Joint Military Training*, Report to Congressional Requesters (GAO/NSIAD-95-109). (Washington: 6 July 1995).
- ⁷ Service training is defined as "Military training based on Service policy and doctrine to prepare individuals and interoperable units. Service training includes basic, technical, operational, and component interoperability training. Component interoperability training can be the result of either combatant commander or Service initiative." - U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States*, CJCSI 3500.01, (Washington: 21 November 1994), B-4.
- ⁸ Secretary of Defense, "U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Implementation Plan," Memorandum, Washington: 1 October, 1993, 1-1; and
- U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Joint Training Master Plan 1998*, CJCSI 3500.2A (Washington: 8 December 1995), A-2.
- ⁹ John J. Sheehan, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, 42.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.
- ¹¹ Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, *Tier Two Exercise Program Guidance Update*, Message, CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA 182335Z NOV 96.
- ¹² U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Joint Training Master Plan 1998*, CJCSI 3500.2A (Washington: 8 December 1995), A-5.
- ¹³ Jay B. Yakeley III and Harold E. Bullock, "Training the Pacific Warriors," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996, 19.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.
- ¹⁵ Joint Warfighting Center, "Naval Doctrine Command: Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) Nears Completion" *A Common Perspective—Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter*, (Ft. Monroe, VA: October 1996), 23.
- ¹⁶ U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Joint Training Master Plan 1998*, CJCSI 3500.2A (Washington: 8 December 1995), A-22.
- ¹⁷ John Terino, "Joint Training—Its Pay-off, Its Future," *National Defense*, November 1991, 15.
- ¹⁸ The only exception to the absence of CONUS-based Army and Air Force units within PACOM is the 25th Infantry Division (Light), which is split between Hawaii and Fort Lewis, Washington.
- ¹⁹ Gregg Higgins, "PAC JTFEX 96-2 Completed," *Third Fleet/USS Coronado Press Releases*, August 20 1996. <http://comthirdfltnavy.mil/c3f/jtfex_2.htm> (20 January 1997)
- ²⁰ For a short summation on the COMPASS program, see Science Applications International Corp., "JTFX '96 Executive Summary," *COMPASS Information* <http://compass.saic.com/files/JTFEX_PAPERS/jtfex_es.html> (17 January 1997).
- ²¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Vision 2010," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996, 44.
- ²² Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, "Training Department Update" *NSAWC Journal*, Fall 1996, 7.
- ²³ Mark Cancian, "The Revolution is Incomplete," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1996, 70.
- ²⁴ See John M. Quigley, "Creating Joint Warfighters," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1995, 64. Also Charles A. Hautau, "Joint Training—Future Dilemmas and Solutions," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 18 June 1993.

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APPENDIX I : Description of Joint Vision 2010's New Operational Concepts

Descriptions of new operational concepts in Joint Vision 2010 are amplified in context as follows:ⁱ

- Dominant Maneuver: “*...the organizational concept of dominant maneuver is a prescription for more agile, faster moving joint operations, which will combine land, maritime, and air forces more effectively to deliver decisive combat power.*”
- Precision Engagement: “*Enhanced jointness will ensure greater commonality between service precision engagement capabilities and provide future joint force commanders with a wider array of responsive, accurate, and flexible options.*”
- Full Dimensional Protection: “*...active and passive measures will be combined to provide a more seamless joint architecture for force protection, which will leverage the contributions of individual services, systems and echelons.*”
- Focused Logistics: “*Logistics functions will incorporate information technologies to transition from the rigid vertical organizations of the past.*”

ⁱ Excerpts are quoted from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2010,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996, 34-49.